International Bulletin of Political
Psychology
Volume 7

Issue 20

Article 1

12-3-1999

Aviation Disaster Primer: Psychologies of Error
IBPP Editor
bloomr@erau.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp
Part of the Aviation Safety and Security Commons, and the Cognitive Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Editor, IBPP (1999) "Aviation Disaster Primer: Psychologies of Error," International Bulletin of Political
Psychology: Vol. 7 : Iss. 20 , Article 1.
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol7/iss20/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu.

Editor: Aviation Disaster Primer: Psychologies of Error

International Bulletin of Political Psychology
Title: Aviation Disaster Primer: Psychologies of Error
Author: Editor
Volume: 7
Issue: 20
Date: 1999-12-03
Keywords: Aviation Disaster, Bias, Cognitive Psychology, Investigation
Abstract. This article describes common psychological phenomena that often mitigate against accurate
induction and deduction of the causes of aviation disasters.
There are two main logical approaches to identifying the causes of aviation disasters. The inductive
approach entails classifying a specific disaster as similar in relevant characteristics to that of other
disasters whose cause has been identified. Once the classification is made, the cause automatically
follows--leaping from the specific to the general. The deductive approach entails following a trail of
associations from specific details to specific causes--each association based on faith in a hypothesis
supported by yet other data. (A third approach is a mixture of the inductive and the deductive.)
But there are problems with the inductive approach. A disaster may be similar in all relevant respects to
a class of past disasters but may be subject to a different cause. This may be because another aspect of
the disaster in question has not before been implicated in a causal chain. Thus, this aspect is not
deemed relevant and a misclassification of the disaster at hand with the class of previous disasters
occurs. Another problem with the inductive approach is that a class of past disasters may be such that
more than one cause may be responsible--but only one cause has so far has been identified. Here, the
disaster in question is correctly characterized as a member of a class of past disasters but has occurred
through the cause that has not yet been identified.
In addition, there are problems with the deductive approach. As was stated above, the associations
linking specific details with specific causes are based on faith in hypotheses supported by data.
Unfortunately, there are just too many pathways to faith-based associations--e.g., majority consensus,
reason-based rules, intuition-based hunches. These and other pathways do not necessarily occupy a
privileged status of causal semiotic.
There are yet other psychological phenomena mitigating against the accurate identification of the
causes of aviation disasters. Professional and lay investigators--as well as other speculators--tend to
more easily discern and construct patterns and related series of events as opposed to a series of random
events. This tendency biases towards some classes of causal factors and against another classes. Yet
another psychological tendency is to allocate unwarranted casual significance to events that can be
easily imagined as opposed to those that cannot be--with respective biases towards and against
respective classes of causal factors.
All the above suggests that an investigative rush to judgment is a recipe for disaster in the identification
of the causes of aviation disasters. (See Blumberg, S.J., & Silvera, D.H. (1998). Attributional complexity
and cognitive development: A look at the motivational and cognitive requirements for attribution. Social
Cognition, 16, 253-266; Calvo, M.G., & Eysenck, M. W. (1998). Cognitive bias to internal sources of
information in anxiety. International Journal of Psychology, 33, 287-299; Durst, M. (1998). Beyond
mathematics, logic, and psychoanalysis towards philosophy. Journal of Melanie Klein and Object
Relations, 16, 87-114; Fiedler, K. (1996). Explaining and simulating judgment biases as an aggregation
phenomenon on probabilistic, multiple-cue environments. Psychological Review, 103, 193-214; Paulos,
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J.A. (November 2, 1999). After a crash, fear overtakes logic. The New York Times, p. A31; Shappell, S.A.,
& Wiegmann, D.A. (1997). A human error approach to accident investigation: The Taxonomy of Unsafe
Operations. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 7, 269-291.) (Keywords: Aviation Disaster, Bias,
Cognitive Psychology, Investigation.)
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